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The time has come to bring the structure of South Carolina's 
executive branch of government out of the horse and buggy era into 
the space age. The current structure is a relic of the last century, 
long since abandoned by most other states. The multitude of 
uncoordinated, unaccountable, uncontrolled, autonomous boards, 
commissiQns, ag~ncies, _ departments, and authorities is simply 
incapable of responding efficiently to the massive demands and 
responsibilities placed on a modern state government. 
Reasons for Restructuring 
Two overriding reasons support the case for restructuring the 
executive branch. 
1. Accountability 
Most executive branch agencies in South Carolina are neither 
accountable nor responsible to the people through any statewide 
elected official. Most of the bureaucracy is accountable only to 
boards and commissions, some of which have few or no appointees 
by any official elected by all the people. For example, the State 
Board of Education has 17 members, only one of whom is appointed 
by the governor. The Highway Commission has 20 members, with 
only two appointed by the governor. The governor appoints no 
members of the Coastal Council, the executive branch agency charged 
with implementing vitally important environmental laws, or the 
state Board of Social Services, which has responsibility for expensive 
and far-reaching social programs. 
In other words, the South Carolina governor is head of the 
executive branch in name only. Most executive branch 
agency directors are not directly accountable to the state's 
chief executive officer. 
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Moreover, boards and commissions are part-time supervisors. Many 
boards and commissions meet only once a month, thereby leaving 
the agencies without any full-time authority to whom they are 
accountable. 
This lack of accountability has several debilitating consequences for 
government in South Carolina. When accusations of agency 
misconduct arise, as they have all too often in the past year, the 
structure inhibits quick resolution of a problem. The problems fester 
until they become full-blown scandals, in the process damaging the 
credibility of all South Carolina government. 
Last spring the Director of the Highway Patrol abused his authority 
by saving another law enforcement officer from a charge of driving 
under the influence of alcohol. Yet the initial response from the 
agency was nothing more than a slap on the wrist. The abuse was 
clear, the public was outraged, and the governor was powerless to 
deal directly with the problem because he had no authority over any 
personnel in the Highway Department. As absurd as it may seem, a 
major executive branch official was simply not accountable to the 
chief executive officer of the state. The situation was not resolved 
until it became a statewide scandal, and the controversy 
demonstrates the organizational paralysis created by our structure of 
government. 
Moreover, as a result of this horse and buggy structure, narrow 
special interests gain undue influence over agency activities. 
Because they are not accountable to an official with a statewide 
perspective, many agencies become dominated by the interest 
groups they serve. Consequently the bureaucracy ends up serving 
the special interests rather than the public interest. 
The lack of accountability creates situations that would be considered 
absurd for any private sector organization. 
As the highest executive official of the state, in the fall of 1989 
Governor Campbell agreed with President Bush and the nation's 
other governors to pursue five national education goals within South 
Carolina. The State Department of Education is the executive branch 
agency that would normally be charged with implementing 
procedures to meet those goals. Yet that agency at the time was 
headed by an elected official from a different political party from the 
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governor who had shown hostility to many of the Governor's 
education initiatives. Moreover, that official had flirted with the idea 
of challenging the Governor for reelection. 
Try to imagine a private sector organization where a department 
head showed open hostility to the programs of the chief executive 
officer, threatened to challenge him for his position, and over whom 
the chief executive officer had no direct influence. How could we 
expect that organization to function? Similarly, how can we 
reasonably expect the governor to be a responsible spokesman for 
the state in national forums when our governmental structure 
includes no accountability and builds in hostility to his efforts from 
within the branch of government he supposedly heads? 
Both our national and state governments are based on a series of 
checks and balances to guard against the abuse of power. -Yet those 
checks and balances are supposed to occur among the legislative, 
judicial, and executive branches of government, not within the 
executive branch. Fragmenting authority within the executive 
branch to the point where it cannot function as a unit is not 
consistent with the constitutional doctrine of checks and balances. 
2. Efficiency 
The current structure of South Carolina state government makes 
efficient and economical delivery of services virtually impossible. 
The multitude of agencies ensures overlapping responsibilities, 
unnecessary duplication, and a bloated number of managers. The 
time has come to stop squandering our tax dollars on such an 
inefficient system. 
Why should our taxpayers support, in the natural resource area 
alone, eleven separate agencies with eleven personnel offices, eleven 
budget offices, and eleven different bureaucracies? Why should our 
state have ten separate agencies and authorities promoting 
commerce within South Carolina? Why should our government have 
nine different departments and commissions dealing with human 
services? Those who oppose restructuring need to answer those 
questions, and show why it is in the public interest to continue such 




The structure of South Carolina state government made sense at the 
time it was adopted in the State Constitution of 1895. Then the role 
of government was far more constrained than it is today. At that 
time automobiles were mere curiosities; today the state builds and 
maintains a complex and extensive highway system to handle 
millions of cars. In 1895 health care was purely a private function; 
today the state-run Medicaid program spends over a billion taxpayer 
dollars every year on health care. In the twentieth century state 
governments have assumed far more responsibilities than they had 
in 1895, with far more complex functions. Yet at the end of the 
twentieth century, South Carolina state government still administers 
those responsibilities with a nineteenth-century structure. 
The difficulties inherent ·in running· a modern state government with 
an outdated structure caused most other states to abandon the board 
and commission system years ago. Thirty-eight states now have 
some form of a cabinet structure, with several departments 
organized by function with heads appointed by and responsible to 
the governor. 
Illinois was one of the first states to reorganize state government 
into a cabinet composed of the heads of major state administrative 
departments. The restructuring replaced over one hundred statutory 
offices, boards, departments, and agencies with nine departments. 
Agency directors replaced independent commissions, who in turn 
reported to and were responsible to the governor. The Illinois 
governor held regular weekly meetings with department heads to 
discuss administrative problems and to determine general 
implementation policies. 
Other states soon followed in restructuring. In 1928, for example, 
the voters of Virginia ratified amendments to the state constitution 
that allowed gubernatorial appointment of state agency heads. 
Seventy-five boards and commissions and about thirty agencies were 
abolished and their functions assumed by eleven departments. 
South Carolina has taken some tentative steps toward greater 
accountability and efficiency, but the extensive revision adopted in 
other states has never been accomplished. For example, in the late 
1940's South Carolina created a Reorganization Commission which 
drafted the Reorganization Act of 1948 that was adopted by the 
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General Assembly. The Act abolished eight state agencies and 
created the present Budget and Control Board to take their place. 
More importantly, the Act recognized that it was in the "public 
interest" that state government be reorganized and made more 
efficient. The act prohibits "any overlapping of executive or 
administrative agencies or their functions, any duplication of effort 
and activities of such agencies, and diffusion of responsibility 
between one or more agencies ... (T)he separate existence and status of 
multiple or numerous agencies and functions having the same or 
related major purposes, the existence under different heads of 
agencies having the same or or similar functions, and the existence of 
agencies or functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of the 
State government's operations." (SC Statutes at Large, 1948, 1950.) 
The call for restructuring was repeated again in 1950 in the South 
Carolina Law Quarterly. Robert M. Figg, a former member of the 
General Assembly and Dean of the USC Law School, argued that 
"there is no state-wide responsibility or accountability to the people 
of the State as a whole for the administration of their public affairs 
or the execution of their laws." The governor, he argued, was elected 
"by all the people of the State" and was the symbol of state 
government. He should be given the authority and power to direct "a 
clean line of command from the top to the bottom and a return line 
of responsibility and accountability from the bottom to the top." In 
this way, the governor "can then be held responsible and accountable 
to the people and to the General Assembly for the conduct of the 
executive branch of government." 
In 1988 the Commission on the Future of South Carolina argued for a 
cabinet form of government with agency heads appointed by and 
responsible to the governor. The board and commission form of 
government, the Commission said, creates a structure where "the 
state's bureaucracies are highly insulated from people they were 
created to serve. This insulation from the citizenry has increased 
feelings of disenchantment, frustration, and apathy among our 
citizens, producing dismal voter participation over recent years." 
Adoption of a cabinet form of government would provide "focused 
accountability." 
The governmental philosophy called for in this restructuring plan is 
not new. On the contrary, it is consistent with the recommendations 
of distinguished observers of the South Carolina government for over 
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forty years. Unfortunately the addition of new agencies and the 
expansion of old ones since 1950 has moved South Carolina in 
precisely the opposite direction from the reforms called for by the 
Reorganization Act of 1948, Dean Figg, and the Commission on the 
Future. The time has come to heed these calls for greater 
accountability and efficiency in South Carolina state government. 
A Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch in 
South Carolina State Government 
The following plan for restructuring the executive branch will bring 
far greater accountability and efficiency to South Carolina state 
government. This plan is not written in stone, and continuing 
discussions may make improvements. This plan can, however, form 
the starting point for our discussions. 
The Governor is indebted to many members of the General 
Assembly, the Commission on the Future, and other observers of 
South Carolina government for their insight and suggestions for 
reform, many of which are incorporated into this proposal. A 
number of bills have already been filed to restructure some aspects 
of the executive branch. This plan uses portions of bills already 
introduced by Representatives Clyborne, Corning, Haskins, Hodges, 
and Huff, and Senators Bryan, Courson, Giese, Martschink, Mullinax, 
Pope, Rose, Setzler, and Wilson. In addition this proposal 
incorporates recommendations from the report of the Commission on 
the Future. 
Lieutenant Governor Nick Theodore, who chaired the Commission on 
the Future, and Representative David Wilkins, Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, will co-chair a Restructuring Commission. That 
Commission will make recommendations to work out the details of 
this restructuring plan, and ensure that it meets the need for greater 
accountability and efficiency. 
This plan constitutes ten cabinet departments organized by function. 
The governor would appoint secretaries of the ten departments with 
the advice and consent of the Senate. Secretaries would report to 
and be responsible to the governor for the management of their 
departments. The ten secretaries would constitute a cabinet for the 
governor, and would meet regularly to coordinate their 
administrative efforts and provide advice. 
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In addition, this plan would ensure the centralization of personnel 
management, procurement, and facilities decisions through the 
Department of Administration. 
Under this plan the superintendent of education and the 
commissioner of agriculture would become the secretaries of 
education and agriculture respectively. The adjutant general would 
be appointed by the governor from a list of three names nominated 
by members of the National Guard~ All nominees for adjutant 
general must be members of the Guard and must have attained a 
rank of at least Colonel. 
The existing boards and commissions would be consolidated as 
advisory boards to the various departments. In some cases a cabinet 
,. department·, would ,have . only -one· advisory· board; · in other- cases it 
might have several boards advising various divisions within a 
department. College and university boards would remain unchanged 
under this proposal. The Restructuring Commission will be charged 
with making recommendations regarding the number, composition, 
and appointment to these new advisory boards. 
Some agencies would not be affected by this proposal. In addition to 
the Constitutional offices of governor, lieutenant governor, state 
treasurer, comptroller general, attorney general, and secretary of 
state, quasi-judicial agencies such as the Human Affairs Commission 
and the Ethics Commission would remain as independent regulatory 
agencies with no change in their governing boards. But many 
agencies would be consolidated into the ten cabinet departments. 
This proposal could not be fully implemented before the end of 
Governor Campbell's administration. Consequently any changes that 
occur would affect only subsequent governors. The major 
beneficiaries of this proposal would be the people of South Carolina, 
for they have paid for and suffered the inefficiencies of an outmoded 
governmental structure for too long. 
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Outline of Proposed Restructuring of the Executive Branch 
South Carolina State Government 
Ten Cabinet Departments 
1. Public Education 
1 . Department of Education 
2. Wil Lou Gray Opportunity School 
3. School for the Deaf and Blind 
4. John de la Howe School 
5. Vocational Rehabilitation 
2 • Higher Education 
1. State Commission on Higher Education 
2. Higher Education Tuition Grants Commission 
3. Colleges and Universities 
4. State Board for Technical and Comprehensive 
Education 
3. Cultural Affairs 
1. State Museum 
2. Department of Archives and History 
3. Arts Commission 
4. State Library 
5. Confederate Relic Room and Museum 
6. Old Exchange Building Commission 
7. Educational Television 
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4. Natural Resources 
1. Water Resources 
2. Land Resources 
3. State Forestry Commission 
4. Department of Agriculture 
5. Clemson University: Public Service Activities 
6. Migratory Waterfowl Committee 
7. Wildlife and Marine Resources Department 
8. Coastal Council 
9. Sea Grant Consortium 
10. Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism: Parks 
and Recreation Divisions 
11. Department of Health and Environmental Control: 
Environmental Division 
5. Commerce 
1. State Development Board 
2. Jobs-Economic Development Authority 
3. Patriots Point Development Authority 
4. Savannah Valley Authority 
5. Housing Finance and Development Authority 
6. Department of Labor 
7. Employment Security Commission 
8. S.C. Research Authority 
9. Department of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism: 
Tourism Division 
1 0. Coordinating Council for Economic Development 
6. Health 
1. Health and Human Services Finance Commission 
2. Department of Health and Environmental Control: 
Health Division 
3. Department of Mental Health 
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7. Human Services 
1. Department of Social Services 
2. Continuum of Care for Emotionally Disturbed Children 
3. Department of Mental Retardation 
4. Commission on Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
5. Children's Foster Care Review Board 
6. Commission for the Blind 
7. Commission on Aging 
8. Department of Veterans. Affairs 
9. Commission on Women 
8. Criminal Justice 
1 . Department of Corrections 
2. Department of Youth Services 
3. Probation, Parole and Pardon Services 
4. Office of Appellate Defense 
5. Criminal Justice Academy 
9. Transportation 
1. Department of Highways and Public Transportation 
2. Aeronautics Commission 
3. Public Railways Commission 
10. Administration 
1. Budget and Control Board 
2. Bond Authority 
a. Consists of the bond capacity of the Jobs Economic 
Development Authority, the State Housing 
Authority, and the Budget and Control Board 




1. Adjutant General 
2. S.C. Law Enforcement Division 
3. Law Enforcement Officers Hall of Fame 
2. Lieutenant Governor 
3. State Treasurer 
4. Comptroller General 
5. Attorney General 
6. Secretary of State 
Independent Re2ulatory A2encjes 
1. Election Commission 
2. Human Affairs Commission 
3. Ethics Commission 
4. Public Service Commission 
5. Workers' Compensation 
1. Workers' Compensation Commission 
2. State Workers' Compensation Fund 
3. Second Injury Fund 
4. Patients' Compensation Fund 
6. Department of Insurance 
7. Board of Financial Institutions 
1. Financial Institutions: Administrative Division 
2. Financial Institutions: Bank Examining Division 
3. Financial Institutions: Consumer Finance Division 
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8. Department of Consumer Affairs 
9. Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission 
1 0. Tax Commission 
11. Procurement Review Panel 
12. Various independent boards and commissions 
(Barbers, nurses, auctioneers, pharmacists, 
chiropracters, etc. ) 
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ETHICS REFORM IN SOUTH CAROLINA 
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1991 
BRIEFING PAPER FOR STATE OF THE STATE ADDRESS 
JANUARY 16, 1991 
In light of the recent federal investigations and prosecution of members of 
the General Assembly in II Operation Lost Trust, II the citizens and public 
leaders of 'this state have had to re-examine our laws regulating the ethical 
conduct of elected and appointed public officials. Public confidence in our 
government has been seriously eroded as allegations of misconduct and 
corruption continue to be made public. This eroding confidence has not 
only affected the guilty, but extends to those dedicated public servants 
who are equally offended and concerned by the actions of a few. In turn, 
the public has also begun to question not only the people involved in the 
offenses, but the institutions of government in which they serve. There is 
little that is more discouraging to those honest public officials and to their 
constituents than the revelation of officials violating the public trust. It is 
with these concerns in mind that Governor Campbell offers the 
Government Accountability Act of 1991, which is comprehensive 
legislation that will substantially alter the way elected officials and 
government employees conduct the people's business in South Carolina. 
It is the Governor's firm belief that the best way to prevent the possibility 
of conflicts of interest is to establish comprehensive public disclosure of all 
economic interests held by public officials and certain employees. 
Complete disclosure will provide the public with the opportunity to judge 
for themselves whether individual officials are involved in improper 
activities. In addition, the way in which public officials interact with 
lobbyists must be curtailed and better regulated. By establishing an 
environment of good ethical behavior and full disclosure, all members of 
the body politic will be finally held to the lofty expectations that the public 
has always held for them. 
This need for reform is not limited to South Carolina. Many states 
including California, West Virginia, Tennessee and New York have recently 
passed landmark legislation to cure the ills of their political system. The 
federal government has also been fine tuning and strengthening its ethics 
laws. 
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This state must be careful to adopt a sound, fair plan that will "grab the 
reins of the runaway horse." The plan must be one that encompasses all of 
the pertinent issues, yet at the same time it must not be petty or so 
concerned with insignificance that the spirit of true reform is lost. While 
the issues that need to be addressed are delicate, the private interest of 
the individual that serves the public is superseded by the public interest 
in good government. 
These principles of Accountability in Government Act of 1991 will bring 
what has long been missing in this state, accountability of government 
officials to the public that elects them. 
The Government Accountability Act of 1991 (the GAA) is divided into five 
sections. These sections include: 
1 ) Campaign Disclosure; 
2) Lobby Reporting and Disclosure; 
3) Financial Disclosure; 
4) Administration of Ethics; and 
5) Public Corruption, conflict of interest and rules of conduct. 
The GAA takes a two track approach to ethics reform. This package 
contains substantially more detailed disclosure of campaign contributions 
and expenditures, lobbying expenditures and more detailed disclosure of 
economic interest of officials and certain employees than is required under 
current law. Secondly, the initiative includes certain limitations and 
prohibitions that create absolute conflict of interest such as honorarias, 
extravagant gifts, travel, and retainer or consultant fees. 
The GAA is more comprehensive than some of the other proposed 
legislation. It follows a more realistic path towards reform. This package 
adopts a more practical gift rule than the "no cup of coffee" rule adopted in 
the House Rules and in the proposed Senate Judiciary Rules. The GAA 
permits limited exchanges involving meals. At the same time, the GAA 
squarely addresses the vastly more pressing problem of members of the 
General Assembly acquiring huge retainers or consultant fees from 
businesses with a direct interest in legislation. To prohibit a lobbyist from 
buying an official a cup of coffee, but to permit the same lobbyist, or his 
principal, to pay a huge retainer fee to the same official is equivalent to a 
police officer arresting a shoplifter while allowing a bank robber to go free. 
We must address both issues and yet not discourage dedicated people from 
entering public service. 
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Although this legislation is offered as a comprehensive solution to ethics 
reform, no statute can instantly and permanently cleanse the body politic 
of corrupt behavior. Nevertheless, the Governor hopes that it will create 
an environment in which the integrity that is demanded by the public is 
expected. 
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTABILITY ACT of 1991 
The Government Accountability Act of 1991 is divided into five 
parts. These parts include: 
1 ) Campaign Disclosure; 
2) Lobbying and Disclosure; 
- 3) Financial Disclosure; 
4) Administration of Ethics; and 
5) Public Corruption, Conflict of Interests, and Rules of Conduct. 
This act is a substantial rewrite of our current law with an extensive 
increase in provisions concerning these five areas. The following is a brief 
synopsis or highlights of each of the five areas of concern. 
Chapter 1: Disclosure and Use of State and Local Campaign 
Funds 
Limits campaign expenditures for only bonafide political purposes; 
Prohibits a candidate's immediate family from rece1vmg payments 
other than reimbursements from the Committee; 
Prohibits use of campaign funds to defray personal living expenses of 
the candidate which are unrelated to the campaign or the office if the 
person is an officeholder; 
Limits cash expenditures to no more than $25. Anything more than 
$25 must be accounted for by receipt indicating date of expenditure, name 
and address of recipient, reason for expenditure, and form of expenditure; 
Prohibits campaign treasurer from withdrawing more than $500 to 
establish or replenish a petty cash fund and such expenditures cannot 
exceed petty cash fund for $25 or more; 
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Requires each candidate to designate one candidate committee by 
filing a statement of organization no longer than 10 days after becoming a 
candidate; 
Requires each candidate committee to have a chairman and a 
treasurer; 
Establishes clear duties for campaign committee treasurers including 
preserving all receipts, bills, loans for a specified period of time; 
Permits the creation of non-candidate committees; however, such 
committees shall file a statement of organization similar to candidate 
committees, and requires specific information of those people directing and 
creating the non-candidate committee; 
Requires a statement of financial interest as defined in Chapter 3 of 
the Act at the same time the candidate files a statement of candidacy; 
Requires detailed reporting forms for candidate and non-candidate 
committees including information concerning loans, expenditures, receipts, 
similar to federal campaign disclosures including the name, occupation and 
employer of contributors; 
Continues to require reporting of contributions over $100 and such 
contributions must be made by check; 
Prohibits cash contributions over $50; 
Requires all campaign disclosure forms to be filed with the State 
Election Commission and the Commission must then forward copies of local 
candidate's forms to the county clerks of court; 
Requires candidates, and now candidate committees, to file 15 days 
before primary date regardless of opposition, and 15 days before the 
general election regardless of opposition, and quar_terly during election 
year and semi-annually during those non-election years; 
All contributions of $1,000 or more, after the pre-election filing, 
must be reported to the Election Commission the Wednesday prior to the 
election and all contributions made available to public inquiry between 
that Wednesday and the day before the election; 
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Limits personal campaign contributions to $2,000 per election and 
association, union, non-candidate political committees, and corporations to 
$5,000 per election; 
All filing forms must be sent to the candidate and candidate 
committees 30 days before each filing period for which each person Is 
required to file a statement; 
Non-candidate committees' surplus funds when they shut down shall 
go to the state general fund charity or be returned pro rata to all 
contributors or a combination of both. Candidate committee surplus funds 
may be used to defray any ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in 
connection with his or her duties as an officeholder, or contributed to 
charities, or to a state and local committee of any political candidate or 
party. No candidate may expend any- such contribution for personal use 
other than defray any reasonable expenses related to his or her duties as a 
holder of state or local office. Candidates may use funds for their next 
election or for election to another office; 
Requires State Election Commission to refer anything more than a 
technical error or omission of a candidate on non-candidate's committee to 
the State Ethics Commission. For technical error or omission the Election 
Commission may assess a penalty not to exceed $100. 
Chapter 2: Regulation of lobbying activities 
Lobbyists must complete an extensive registration form with the 
Secretary of State within 15 days after becoming a lobbyist. They must 
also file reports of all individual expenditures, contributions and gifts of 
$50 or more every six months and preserve those records for three years; 
The Secretary of State is responsible for the registration, reporting, 
preserving of lobbyists' disclosures, and the Attorney General, with SLED 
assistance, shall conduct all preliminary investigations of lobbyists' activity 
referred them by the Secretary of State; 
Specifically prohibits lobbyists from serving as treasurers on 
candidate committees, or receiving compensation contingent upon the 
outcome of a specific legislation; 
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Lobbyists are required to file a separate report for each lobbyist's 
principal with a list of contributions, expenditures and gifts paid by the 
lobbyists or on behalf of each lobbyist principal during the reporting 
period. The report includes a description of a contribution or expenditure 
of $50 or more in the aggregate in one year initiated by a lobbyist to an 
executive, legislative or local official or employee including their name, 
legislative, executive or local government official or employee receiving 
payment and on whose behalf the expenditure was made; 
The report must also include the amount of fees, retainers and/or 
expenses paid to lobbyists by lobbyist principal. Reporting requirements 
are due no later than March 31 and September 30 for each preceding six 
month period. March 31st report shall include a cumulative total for the 
prior year of all reportable categories; 
Registration reporting provisions do not apply to members of the 
General Assembly, the Governor, other elected state officials or their staff 
members if acting in their official capacity. For individuals who represent 
themselves and receive no compensation or anything of value for lobbying 
and have no direct interest in legislative, executive or local government 
actions, no reporting is required. Also excludes reporting by an employee 
of the executive branch who provides formal testimony for a public 
meeting of a legislative body or executive agency; 
Requires lobbyist principle to report the names and addresses of 
those lobbyists retained for its benefit annually; 
Prohibits lobbyist or lobbyist principals from paying honoraria to 
state official or employees; 
Prohibits lobbyist or lobbyist principal or regulated industry from 
employing on retainer any state official or employee or any firm or 
organization in which they have a financial interest; 
Prohibits lobbyists from serving on a state board or commission; 
Requires lobbyists to also file termination reports as an intention of 
their final accounting of their lobbying activity for a particular client; and 
Prescribes specific duties for the Secretary of State and the Attorney 
General and the enforcement of this Act, and provides a fine of not more 
the $2,000, or three years in jail, for lobbyists who knowingly or willfully 
violate the provisions of this chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Financial Disclosure for Legislative, Executive, 
Judicial, and Local Officers and Specified Employees 
This section specifically provides those individuals required to file 
financial disclosure reports. The reports themselves are considerably more 
detailed than those currently required and are based upon federal 
government financial disclosure provisions. It requires reporting the 
income earned and unearned by the individual, the spouse, and their 
dependent children. Unearned income is reported in categories of value. 
Also requires specific fees as earned income, earned by a member of the 
General Assembly and other public officials from people who are regulated 
or have a direct interest in legislation currently before the General 
Assembly; 
Includes ,the. specific reporting of earned income (retainers, 
consultant fees, or legal fees) from individuals or groups who have a direct 
interest in legislation; 
Requires a reporting of gifts of transportation, lodging, food or 
entertainment aggregating $250 or more in value from any source other 
than relatives for the preceding calendar year, loans exceeding specific 
amounts per year, and liabilities aggregating $5,000 or more during the 
preceding calendar year; 
Requires a reporting of reimbursements of transportation, lodging, 
food or entertainment aggregating $250 or more in value from any source 
other than relatives for the preceding calendar year; 
Requires all assets in their categories of value excluding personal 
residences and automobiles and transactions in real or personal property 
which exceed $1,000 in value; 
Also requires the filer to report positions such as director, officer, 
consultants, etc. which the filer holds, and report any agreements with 
respect to future employment, leave of absence during government 
service, and continuation of payments from former employers; and 
Allows the Ethics Commission to grant an extension of time if 
requested prior to the April 15th filing date of each year, not to exceed 30 
days, and provides the public right for inspection of these reports, and 
penalties for failure to file or falsifying reports to be prosecuted by the 
Attorney General. 
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Chapter 4: The Administration of Ethics 
Creates a nine member State Ethics Commission appointed by the 
Governor, with advice and consent of the General Assembly; 
Prohibits members of the Ethics Commission from being public 
officials, public employees, candidates or officials in political parties, 
lobbyists or members of the immediate families of such individuals while a 
member or employee of the Commission. . Also prohibits these members 
and employees of the Commission from participating in any kind of 
political activity; 
Commissioners are appointed for five year terms and may serve only 
one term; 
Commission is granted the authority to issue advisory opinions and 
m certain circumstances provides for confidentiality of those opinions; 
Gives the Commission power to conduct investigations, inquiries, and 
hearings; 
Requires the assistance of other state agencies for the conducting its 
investigations, and provides for the Commission to institute its own 
complaints if it receives information for violation. Complaints may also be 
initiated by individuals if they specifically allege a violation of the act and 
set forth the particulars of that violation; 
Commission shall conduct a preliminary investigation to determine 
whether probable cause exists at which time it can subpoena documents, 
take testimony and make a report of probable cause of violation if it 
deems so to the complainant and respondent. If probable cause is 
determined, then the matter goes before a three person panel of the 
Commission to conduct a hearing. Once all the evidence is gathered, the 
Commission Panel shall find its ruling and issue its order and 
recommendation. Orders and recommendations can include everything 
from censure, suspension, removal from office, impeachment, other 
remedies provided for in the Code; and for the forfeiture of gifts or profits 
resulting from violations of the act, etc.; 
Since this act eliminates legislative ethics committees, the 
Commission can only offer recommendations to the presiding officer of 
each chamber as to what action should be taken against a member of the 
General Assembly; 
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It provides an opportunity for the respondent to file an appeal of a 
three man panel to the full Commission for review. If deemed appropriate, 
such review will stay any of the recommendations filed by the Panel; 
Provides a civil penalty for those who file complaints that are 
willfully malicious and without just cause; 
No complaint filed sixty days before the election of a candidate or 
official shall be accepted by the commission; 
Permits the Commission to refer any criminal violations to the 
Attorney General, and if in the period of a year the Attorney General fails 
to prosecute, allows the Ethics Commission to request the appointment of a 
special prosecutor with the permission of the Budget and Control Board to 
prosecute the matter; and 
Provides a statute of limitation of three years for acts alleged prior to 
the complaint. 
Chapter 5: Rules of Conduct, Conflicts of Interest, and Public 
Corruption 
Clarifies use of official position or office for financial gain by defining 
close family member; 
Provides that if the public official or public employee is required 
during the discharge of official business participating in a government 
decision which affects any economic interests held by him or his close 
family . member or an individual business of which he is associated, he 
must file a written statement of a potential conflict of interest, abstain 
from voting, and remove himself from the meeting in which that issue is 
raised; 
Prohibits nepotism; 
Continues restrictions on members of the General Assembly or 
members of their firm from representing clients before certain state 
agencies. Also precludes a member of a governing body or a member of 
their firm from representing clients before the agency, board, committee 
or commission under the jurisdiction of that governing body upon which 
he serves; 
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Excludes appearances in circuit court, probate court, family court or 
magistrate's court in which the public official is required to appear in a 
matter affecting his business interests as an owner or officer of the 
business; 
Has a "Keating 5" amendment that allows a member of the General 
Assembly to communicate properly with the executive or independent 
agency concerning the matter before them, but prohibits ex parte 
communications on matters currently under adjudication, or in any way 
threatens or intimidates agency representatives with retaliatory action if 
they fail to comply with the member's specific requests or demands; and 
Prohibits anyone from coercing, commanding, or requiring public 
officials or employees to give money, service or other things of value in a 
political campaign. 
In conclusion, this Act: 
Provides more detailed reporting requirements both in financial 
disclosure and personal economic interest forms; 
Expands the authority of the Ethics Commission and places most of 
the reporting requirements under their jurisdiction except for lobbying act; 
Further assigns responsibilities with respect to the State Ethics 
Commission, the State Election Commission, the Attorney General, and the 
Secretary of State; and 
Expands those issues involving conflicts of interest in public 
corruption to all local officials and employees. 
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